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Universal Basic Income—Introduction 
Almost daily, we confront media coverage regarding universal basic income (UBI). Stories abound in every 
major media outlet from CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News to 
the New York Times, Boston Globe, Washington Post, and 
the Wall Street Journal. On the presidential debate stage, 
American entrepreneur and Democratic presidential candi-
date Andrew Yang has made UBI a primary platform of his 
campaign, proposing “The Freedom Dividend,” a $1,000 
per month stipend for every American adult. In the state 
of Maine, on June 19, 2019, Governor Janet Mills signed 
LD 1324 into law. This bill created a committee to study 
the benefits and feasibility for starting a universal basic 
income program for the state of Maine. After their research 
is complete, this 13-member committee will present their 
findings and draft bills for the Maine Legislature to consider 
in 2020. Though it may seem like a left-leaning policy at 
first blush, the concept has gained bipartisan popularity 
with support from the Adam Smith Institute and the Cato 
Institute, two major right-leaning think tanks, which are 
both exploring policy options and publishing papers that 
argue about UBI’s ability to fix the broken welfare state. 
The nonpartisan publication at the Margaret Chase 
Smith Policy Center, Maine Policy Review, featured a 
commentary by philosopher Michael Howard titled, 
“Universal Basic Income: Policy Options at National, State, 
and Local Levels.” This article created quite a stir in policy 
circles throughout the state, polarizing opinions and 
provoking intense debate. Attorney and adjunct faculty 
member at the University of Southern Maine Dave Canarie 
wrote a counter to Howard’s piece entitled “Not Ready for 
Prime Time: A Response to ‘Universal Basic Income: Policy 
Options at National, State, and Local Levels,’” where he 
highlighted the social and economic costs of a guaranteed 
income policy for all Americans. Howard wanted his 
chance to respond. It became clear that this was an 
important conversation for the state of Maine worthy of 
debate in a public forum. We invited local, regional, and 
international experts on UBI to participate in a new feature 
for the Margaret Chase Smith Policy Center: Maine Policy 
Perspectives. In total, the perspectives of seven individuals 
are included in this roundtable regarding UBI.
So what is UBI? Oftentimes, media reports regarding 
UBI are rather vague. Academic and policy researchers, 
however, typically use the term universal basic income or 
simply basic income in reference to a program that provides 
payments to everyone in a given community—whether 
local, state, or national. This stipend would have no strings 
attached and individuals would receive a UBI regardless of 
their personal economic condition or employment status. 
In theory, UBI should be able to provide an amount suffi-
cient to pay for an individual’s basic necessities, a figure that 
is nearly as debated as the idea itself. 
Howard’s commentary in MPR highlighted the world-
wide interest in UBI policies from the municipal level in 
the United States to European-wide initiatives debated in 
the European Union. He listed four main reasons in 
support of UBI:
• Fear that automation and artificial intelligence 
will displace workers
• Realization that current social safety-net 
programs neither provide jobs nor eliminate 
poverty
• Desire to address rising inequalities
• Aspiration to remunerate individuals for care 
work, volunteering, and environmentally sustain-
able lifestyles
Howard also notes two major categories of objections 
against UBI, which he generally describes as economic and 
moral. On a economic level, opponents argue that it is 
impossibly expensive. He contends that through the simpli-
fication of the welfare system and increased income taxes, a 
federal value-added tax, or the taxation of resources held in 
common UBI is expensive, but feasible. On moral grounds, 
opponents fear that giving individuals a stipend with no 
needed behavioral modifications or preliminary means 
testing would subsidize able-bodied individuals who simply 
chose not to work. Howard admits that some people would 
take advantage of the system; however, he argues that most 
people, if given the chance, would use their UBI to fund 
personal growth through education, artistic creation, or 
entrepreneurship; care for their children or aging family 
members; volunteer their time to provide community 
services; or seize the ability to live simply in an environ-
mentally sustainable lifestyle. Howard also contends that 
the idea of decoupling income from work should not be 
seen as radical in the current capitalist society of the United 
States. In fact, he points out that through inherited wealth, 
interest, and dividends, many people already have uncondi-
tional income, and society does not view these types of 
income as promoting laziness.
Howard then explores policy options at the federal, 
state, and local levels. He highlights that UBI was actually 
quite popular in the 1960s and 1970s and was supported 
by both of the major political parties. Martin Luther King 
and Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern 
favored minimum guaranteed income while right-wing 
economist Milton Friedman supported a means-tested 
unconditional minimum income. In fact, President Richard 
Nixon was in favor of a modified version of Friedman’s 
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model, the Family Assistance Plan, which passed the 
House of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate. 
Howard points to the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend 
as a successful policy for states to redistribute monies 
gained through access to common resources, which has 
been in effect since 1976. In resource-poor states such as 
Maine, Howard argues, taxes on carbon, earned income 
tax credits, and universal child allowances are experiments 
with UBI-type programs that can stimulate public 
discourse, provide empirical evidence, and suggest exam-
ples for more nuanced welfare reform programs in the 
national sphere based on UBI.
 The individuals participating in this Maine Policy 
Perspectives roundtable were asked to read “Universal 
Basic Income: Policy Options at National, State, and Local 
Levels” as well as Dave Canarie’s rebuttal. They then were 
asked to briefly draw upon their expertise and experiences 
to argue for or against UBI. Though it is not necessary, we 
invite readers of this roundtable to first peruse Michael 
Howard’s original commentary in MPR that sparked this 
lively debate. The structure of this Maine Policy Perspectives 
forum is that three arguments against UBI will be 
presented first followed by three arguments in support of 
UBI. Finally, having read all of the pieces by our panel, 
Michael Howard receives the last word of the forum by 
responding to the discourse created by his initial commen-
tary in MPR. 
The first piece in this forum is a republishing of “Not 
Ready for Prime Time: A Response to ‘Universal Basic 
Income: Policy Options at National, State, and Local 
Levels’” by Dave Canarie. Canarie argues that UBI is stag-
geringly expensive, that inherited wealth, interest, and 
dividend payments are not decoupled from labor but 
directly tied to labor, that wealth and success is not always 
linked to luck and privilege, and that abandoning our 
current social safety net for the experiment of UBI is too 
great a risk when the consequences of failure are a burden 
of the nation’s most vulnerable citizens. Canarie’s piece is 
followed by historian Daniel S. Soucier who argues that 
the technological changes wrought by automation and 
artificial intelligence may be no more disruptive than tech-
nological changes that have occurred in the past. Instead 
technological change often leads to unforeseen economic 
opportunities and eventual economic growth. He also 
argues that abandoning our current social safety net, which 
has been built on decades of worker displacement due to 
disruptive technologies, is misguided policy. Finally, 
human rights economist Philip Harvey argues that UBI 
fails to secure both the right to work and the right to 
income security as highlighted by the United Nations. In 
fact, by providing everyone with the same income stipend, 
UBI, because of its universality, provides no additional 
compensation to displaced workers, nor does it provide 
low-wage earners with additional real income. Harvey 
notes that despite even though UBI is currently fiscally 
unattainable, the opportunity costs are also prohibitively 
high. Instead, monies should be focused on job programs 
that get able-bodied individuals into the workforce and on 
providing truly unstigmatized livable income to those in 
society unable to be self-supporting.
Project Manager at the Future of Humanity Institute 
Georg Arndt and economist Karl Wiederquist argue that 
the actual cost of UBI policy options are far less than the 
gross cost, but far more difficult to calculate. They contend 
that the gross cost of UBI is misleading because a substan-
tial amount of UBI is paid for by individuals based on the 
income they already earn. For example, if the government 
taxes an individual $5,000 and then pays that person a 
dividend of $5,000, the net cost of UBI for that individual 
is zero dollars. Thus, Arndt and Widerquist argue that any 
argument against UBI based on gross costs without 
discussing exact tax burden and marginal tax rates are 
misleading and not very useful in the overall debate of the 
topic. Sociologist Luisa Deprez notes that income is not 
keeping pace with the cost of basic needs, especially in the 
state of Maine. Further exacerbating matters is the precar-
iousness of social safety-net programs at the federal level. 
With income inequality on the rise and current programs 
proving ineffective at solving the issue of poverty, Deprez 
calls for careful review of the literature regarding UBI and 
for a serious debate of its feasibility as a policy option at the 
state level instead of merely dismissing it as “not ready for 
prime time.” Finally, political scientist Almaz Zelleke 
argues that UBI is far superior to our current social safe-
ty-net programs. Its universality ensures no one falls 
through the cracks. Its unconditionality provides income 
for those who contribute to society outside of the tradi-
tional workforce. Its flat benefit does not penalize individ-
uals who improve their status through the combining of 
households or through part-time, seasonal, and temporary 
employment. Further, UBI is an ethical statement by 
society that everyone deserves access to the means neces-
sary to a healthy and productive life. Zelleke closes by 
contending that the best way to get UBI into the national 
agenda—as with many initially controversial policy 
measures—is to implement it in a few forward-thinking 
states such as Maine.
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Universal Basic Income:  
Policy Options at National, State, and Local Levels
by Michael W. Howard
On September 11, 2018, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced 
the formation of a task force “to pursue 
the exploration of Universal Basic 
Income in the city.” Emanuel was 
responding to a resolution proposed by 
Alderman Ameya Pawar and supported 
by others on the city council (Byrne 
2018; Coelho 2018; McFarland 2018). 
Pawar was inspired by the pilot project 
being launched in Stockton, California, 
which will give 100 people $500 per 
month for 18 months. This project was 
motivated by worries about automation 
and the desire to provide more oppor-
tunity for people in poor communities 
(Crane 2018). Pilot projects with various 
kinds of minimum-income schemes 
have been completed, announced, 
or begun in Oakland, California; 
Barcelona, Spain; Ontario, Canada; 
Finland; Scotland; India; Kenya; 
Uganda; Namibia; and the Netherlands 
(https://basicincome.org/topic/pilot 
-experiments/; Haarmann and Haarmann 
2014; Kotecki 2018; McFarland 2017a, 
2017c; Standing et al. 2015). In 2016, 
Swiss citizens initiated and voted on a 
referendum to give every Swiss citizen 
an unconditional basic income adequate 
for basic needs and a life of dignity 
(Martin 2016), and a European-wide 
initiative for basic income, with the 
support of 300,000 EU citizens, was 
presented to the European Parliament 
in 2013–2014 , but was voted down 
in 2017 (McFarland 2017b). There is 
worldwide interest in basic income, and 
the concept has been considered favor-
ably, if not yet embraced, by some 
American politicians at the national level 
(Clinton 2017; Obama 2018).
Supporters of basic income include 
Silicon Valley tycoons and others who 
worry that artificial intelligence and 
automation will displace more jobs than 
they will create, necessitating new forms 
of income security for those who are 
displaced. The concept is also supported 
by many people who recognize that 
current welfare policies are not effective 
at eliminating poverty or moving people 
into work. Other supporters see basic 
income as a way to address rising 
inequality, while some supporters see it 
as a way to partially decouple income 
from paid employment, as a way to 
recognize and encourage care work, 
volunteering, or more sustainable living 
(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017). 
DEFINITION OF A BASIC INCOME
What is a basic income? Is it a desirable and feasible policy? And 
could such a policy be implemented on 
a state or local level?
Although press coverage is rather 
vague, most researchers use the term 
basic income to refer to an income that 
is given to all, periodically rather than in 
a lump sum, individually rather than to 
households, and not conditional on 
need, willingness to work, or other 
behavioral requirements. Some add that 
a basic income is sufficient for basic 
needs, but exactly what this level is, is 
subject to much debate. We can distin-
guish roughly between a full basic 
income that would satisfy some such 
requirement, and a partial basic income 
that would fall short of that level. A 
basic income is distinct from other 
forms of guaranteed minimum income 
including a negative income tax (uncon-
ditional, but means tested), a participa-
tion income (conditional on making 
some form of meaningful contribution 
to society, but not necessarily paid 
employment), universal child allowances 
(going unconditionally to all children, 
regardless of means), and capital grants 
(universal, but given in a lump sum, for 
example, at age 18).  
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR
I have already hinted at the arguments for basic income. If automation 
displaces more jobs than it creates—a 
proposition that is debated even among 
supporters of basic income—then 
decoupling income from labor may be 
necessary to avoid growing poverty. An 
Oxford University study predicted that 
nearly half of all jobs in America will 
likely be eliminated by automation in 
the next few decades (Frey and Osborne 
2013). Think of drivers displaced by self-
driving vehicles, food-service workers 
displaced by robot waiters, and retail 
sales clerks displaced by automatic 
checkout machines. This conclusion 
has been challenged by critics noting 
that, although tasks within jobs may be 
eliminated, the jobs may remain and be 
redefined (Arntz, Gregory,  and Zierahn 
2016; Chui, Manyika, and Miremadi 
2016;). Still, if 60 percent of a job can 
be taken over by a computer, then there 
38
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may be a need for only 40 percent of 
the workers in that occupation. Actual 
job loss might be closer to 9 percent, 
according to Arntz, Gregory,  and 
Zierahn (2016). 
Related to, but distinct from, the 
automation argument is the argument 
from precarity—an insecure or unpre-
dictable existence, which may affect a 
person’s psychological well-being—
(Standing 2014). Although the American 
economy has been creating jobs steadily, 
many of these jobs are part-time, tempo-
rary, and poorly paid. Thus a second 
argument for basic income is that it is 
needed to ensure that workers have 
adequate income and do not need to 
work two full-time jobs, or several part-
time jobs, to make ends meet. A basic 
income, which at first glance appears to 
be anti-work by giving people income 
not conditional on willingness to work, 
is in fact more work friendly than the 
current system, which creates a poverty 
trap: people do not seek employment for 
fear of losing their means-tested and 
conditional benefits. Because people 
keep their basic income when they find 
employment, this disincentive to a job is 
completely eliminated.
A third argument for basic income 
challenges what we mean by work. Much 
of the necessary work in our society is 
not counted as part of GDP (gross 
domestic product), and is done without 
remuneration, and often in conditions of 
economic dependency. This fact is espe-
cially true for household care of children 
and the elderly, which is done dispropor-
tionately by women. A basic income 
would give recognition to this work, 
afford women some measure of economic 
independence, and at an adequate level, 
lift them and their children out of 
poverty. Moreover, it would do so 
without the bureaucratic difficulties that 
would arise from trying to administer 
wages for housework. In addition, a 
basic income would facilitate other kinds 
of meaningful, but unremunerated, 
contributions to society, such as volun-
teering for nonprofit organizations.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
Among objections to basic income, the two most prominent are finan-
cial and moral. The gross cost of a basic 
income appears quite large. If every legal 
US resident were given an annual basic 
income of, say, $12,000 per adult, and 
$6,000 per child, the gross cost would 
be $3.415 trillion (Widerquist 2017). 
But the gross cost is not very mean-
ingful. Everyone would receive a basic 
income, but the more affluent would 
be net contributors: they would pay 
more in taxes than they would receive 
in basic income. The poor would be net 
beneficiaries. And some people would 
break even. 
The more interesting question is the 
net cost for the net contributors. The 
answer varies depending on how a basic 
income is integrated with the tax system. 
But with a 50 percent tax surcharge on 
earned income, the net cost would be 
less than one-sixth of the gross cost, 
$539 billion. And that is without consid-
ering the potential elimination of other 
programs, such as food stamps or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) benefits, which might be redun-
dant with a basic income. Furthermore, 
this net cost also does not take into 
account the savings that would likely 
result from improved health and lower 
crime rates. Although $539 billion is 
still expensive, it is feasible. Especially if 
we consider that it would completely 
eliminate poverty for 43 million people, 
including 14.5 million children. More 
modest proposals of about half this level, 
such as that of Facebook cofounder 
Chris Hughes (2018), who favors a 
means-tested negative income tax with a 
work requirement—but broadening the 
definition of work to include care work 
and other socially useful activities—
could be funded with moderate tax 
increases on those making more than 
$250,000 per year.
There are other ways of funding a 
basic income besides income tax. Andrew 
Yang (2018), who is running for the 
Democratic presidential nomination in 
2020, favors a basic income of $1,000 
per month, funded by a value-added tax 
(cf. Walker 2016). Peter Barnes (2014) 
favors taxing common resources, such as 
natural resources, electromagnetic spec-
trum, the use of the atmosphere as a 
carbon sink, and the right to create 
money, which could support a basic 
income of around $5,000 per year, rather 
than being given away to private compa-
nies. Barnes’s model is Alaska’s Permanent 
Fund Dividend, around  $1,400 per year 
paid to every Alaskan, including chil-
dren, from the annual interest earned by 
Alaska’s sovereign wealth fund, which 
has been capitalized with royalties paid 
by oil companies drilling on the North 
Slope since the 1970s. The dividend has 
contributed to Alaska’s relatively low 
rates of poverty and inequality 
(Widerquist and Howard 2012a, 2012b). 
Hillary Clinton (2017) considered 
proposing something similar, “Alaska for 
America,” during her presidential 
campaign. There are pros and cons to 
these different funding schemes, but the 
main point is that a basic income is 
affordable.
The bigger hurdle may well be the 
moral objection, that it is wrong to give 
people “something for nothing.” 
Wouldn’t this be taxing hard-working 
39
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people to give income to able-bodied 
free-riders? Isn’t it better to stick with 
our current system of benefits, condi-
tional on a willingness to work? Doesn’t 
the social contract include a principle of 
reciprocity—that those who receive 
from society should, if they are able, give 
back by contributing to society?
Responses to this objection are of 
two sorts. The first concedes the prin-
ciple of reciprocity, but argues, pragmat-
ically, that conditionality is not worth 
the cost. Most people, if given a modest 
basic income, will use it to enable them-
selves to participate in society. Most will 
seek employment in order to have more 
than a poverty-level income. Some will 
elect to stay at home with children or 
aging parents. There is evidence to 
support these claims from numerous 
experiments with minimum income. A 
few may choose to live very simply—in 
itself an environmental boon—while 
focusing their time on volunteering, 
further education, or artistic creativity. If 
fears about automation materialize, a 
basic income will facilitate work-time 
reduction and work sharing (whether or 
not these are legislated), so that people 
can enjoy greater leisure, rather than 
suffer greater insecurity, as the produc-
tivity of labor rises. If there are a few 
loafers who decide to do nothing or to 
take drugs—and let’s face it, the current 
system does not prevent this—the 
resulting harm is outweighed by the 
social benefits of unconditional income 
for all.
The second response challenges the 
principle of reciprocity by noting that 
much of the income in modern capitalist 
societies is already decoupled from labor. 
Many people inherit wealth and can live 
entirely on interest and dividends, 
without doing a day’s work in their lives. 
(That many of these people do work is a 
further answer to those who think 
unconditional income will promote lazi-
ness.) Whether you are fortunate enough 
to inherit wealth, or have family connec-
tions or other advantages of affluence, is 
a matter of luck—something that Chris 
Hughes (2018) lucidly illustrates from 
his own experience.
All that basic income does is 
distribute this luck—the unearned 
income—more equally, so that everyone 
starts out on a more level playing field. 
Reciprocity is not rejected; it just comes 
into play on the foundation of a more 
fundamental principle of guaranteeing 
everyone a fair share of assets. Above the 
basic income, earned income is distrib-
uted in proportion to work (Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght 2017).
POSSIBLE NATIONAL,  
STATE, AND LOCAL  
BASIC-INCOME POLICIES
It is not too difficult to imagine a basic income being adopted at a 
national level. After all, in the 1960s 
and early1970s, there was support across 
the political spectrum for a guaran-
teed minimum income. Martin Luther 
King (1967) endorsed the idea. George 
McGovern ran as the Democratic candi-
date for president favoring a demogrant 
(Mound 2016), a kind of guaranteed 
minimum income. Libertarian econo-
mist Milton Friedman (1962) favored 
a negative income tax, a means-tested, 
but otherwise unconditional minimum 
income. Richard Nixon’s Family 
Assistance Plan was a modified version 
of Friedman’s proposal, and it passed 
the House, but failed to pass in the 
Senate (Steensland 2017). Poverty is 
still with us, inequality is rising, and 
we face new threats from technological 
change. Among political parties, the 
Green Parties around the world are the 
strongest supporters of basic income 
(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017). 
But the idea is also favored by social 
movements, such as the Movement for 
Black Lives (https://policy.m4bl.org 
/reparations/). The social conditions are 
certainly favorable for a national debate 
about basic income.
Are basic-income policy proposals 
relevant at the state or local level? Alaska’s 
Permanent Fund Dividend illustrates 
how states can create dividends from 
sovereign wealth funds, or more directly 
from taxation of the use of common 
assets. But what about resource-poor 
states like Maine? Gary Flomenhaft 
(2012) calculated that even Vermont, 
also a resource-poor state, has enough 
resources that, if all the rents were taxed, 
and the revenue distributed as dividends, 
every citizen could receive between 
$1,900 and over $10,000 annually. Of 
course, clawing back these resources 
after having turned them over to private 
companies would face major political 
challenges. 
A more modest, partial basic income 
could be created at the state level in 
several ways. A state-level carbon tax, 
desirable as a way to reduce fossil-fuel 
emissions, could yield a significant 
universal dividend, and the dividend 
would rectify an otherwise regressive and 
unpopular consumption tax. A carbon 
tax with progressive tax reductions has 
been implemented successfully in British 
Columbia (Durning and Bauman 2014).
The earned income tax credit, which 
exists at the state as well as the federal 
level, could be made refundable. That is, 
those without earned income would 
receive a credit, increasing their income 
when it falls below a minimum. It is 
unlikely that refundable tax credits or 
carbon taxes at the state level could be 
large enough to adequately address 
either the environmental requirements 
or the income needs, but policies at the 
40
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state level can pave the way for more 
adequate policies at the federal level, 
when the political environment there 
becomes more favorable. 
Other policies that could be intro-
duced at the state level are a universal 
child allowance or a refundable child tax 
credit. Universal child allowances are 
minimum incomes that go to all chil-
dren regardless of means or behavioral 
conditions. 
Lastly, at the municipal or state 
level, pilot projects such as those 
discussed earlier can generate public 
discussion of minimum-income policies 
and empirical evidence to inform policy 
making. Any Maine city, particularly 
with grant support, could launch similar 
experiments.  
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In a recent Maine Policy Review commentary, “Universal Basic 
Income: Policy Options at National, 
State and Local Levels,” Professor 
Michael W. Howard presents the case 
for a universal basic income (UBI) and 
suggests it could be tested in Maine. 
He writes that there was “support across 
the political spectrum for a guaranteed 
minimum income” in the 1960s and 
1970s (Howard 2018: 40) and suggests 
three arguments in favor of UBI: to 
address future job loss associated with 
artificial intelligence, to fight precarcity, 
and to support unremunerated work 
such as caring for children or the elderly.
Universal basic income is an idea 
that sounds great in theory but struggles 
mightily when considered in detail. 
According to an article in the New York 
Times, former Treasury Secretary Larry 
Summers described UBI as “one of those 
ideas that the longer you look at it, the 
less enthusiastic you become”(“A 
Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Tool to 
Fight Poverty,” Eduardo Porter, May 31, 
2016). That may explain why universal 
income proposals were not adopted in 
the 1960s, even though it was during the 
height of the War on Poverty. 
UBI is staggeringly expensive. The 
study cited in Howard’s commentary 
(Widerquist 2017) lists a total cost for a 
nationwide UBI program of $3.415 tril-
lion. This price tag approaches the cost 
of all current federal spending, which the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates 
to be $4.4 trillion for 2019, and it is 
virtually equal to the $3.4 trillion 
collected by the Internal Revenue Service 
for all income taxes in 2017. UBI would 
require massive an unprecedented expen-
diture: its cost is almost as large as the 
entire current federal budget and equal 
to all current income tax receipts.1 
The commentary asserts, “the gross 
cost is not very meaningful” (Howard 
2018: 39), but of course it is. Professor 
Howard claims that the actual cost of the 
program is one-sixth of the gross cost, or 
$539 billion, because everyone would 
receive $12,000 per year ($6,000 for 
children), while people with earned 
income would pay “a 50 percent tax 
surcharge on their income” (Howard 
2018: 39). No matter how one funds 
it—whether from general revenues, a tax 
increase, or a combination of the two—
the program still costs $3.415 trillion. 
Additionally, the commentary does not 
explain the 50 percent tax surcharge on 
all earned income. Is it a flat 50 percent 
tax rate for all taxpayers? Is 50 percent 
added to existing tax rates? Is the 50 
percent tax means tested? Although the 
commentary does briefly examine other 
ways to fund UBI and other basic income 
levels, the costs of UBI are staggering 
and will increase every year as the popu-
lation grows. Moreover, the growth in 
UBI cost will become exponential when 
the inevitable calls for cost-of-living 
adjustments in the annual UBI payout 
are adopted.
In pre-empting an argument that 
UBI gives people “something for 
nothing,” Howard asserts, “much of the 
income in modern capitalist societies is 
already decoupled from labor” (Howard 
2018: 40). I don’t think that is true for 
most people in Maine, however. Even 
people who are not actively working, for 
example, Social Security and private 
pension recipients, receive income that is 
directly related to their labor because 
they paid FICA tax and made 401k 
contributions during their working years. 
I also disagree with the claim that 
the “advantages of affluence [are often] a 
matter of luck” (Howard 2018: 40). 
Sometimes they are, but try talking 
about luck to a Lewiston physician who 
took difficult courses in high school and 
college, studied brutally long hours in 
medical school, incurred a lot of debt, 
and is coming off a 24-hour shift. Try 
asking a Bangor CPA about her luck 
when she is busy all year and works long 
hours during tax season. Try explaining 
affluence luck to a small business owner 
in Kittery who made all-in personal 
commitments of time, energy, money, 
and passion to launch and nurture his 
business. Most Maine people accumu-
late wealth through hard work, long 
hours, and by saving and investing their 
hard-earned money. 
The commentary claims that a 
universal income “would completely 
eliminate poverty for 43 million people, 
including 14.5 million children,” and as 
a result we could consider “the potential 
elimination of other programs, such as 
food stamps or Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) benefits, which 
might be redundant with basic income” 
(Howard 2018: 39). One of my critiques 
of Professor Howard’s well-researched 
commentary is that it does not consider 
the implications of these statements.
If UBI is presented as a way to 
completely eliminate poverty, there is no 
doubt that our existing social welfare 
Not Ready for Prime Time: A Response to 
“Universal Basic Income: Policy Options at 
National, State, and Local Levels”
by Dave Canarie
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safety net would be targeted for signifi-
cant reduction if not elimination. In 
fact, existing social programs would 
likely be offered up as a way to fund the 
cost of UBI. If poverty is eliminated, the 
argument would likely go, we can elimi-
nate anti-poverty programs and use the 
savings to pay for UBI.
Perhaps a guaranteed income would 
adequately replace existing social welfare 
programs for the current beneficiaries, 
and they won’t lose out in the transition 
to UBI. That’s a huge leap of faith, 
however, and the migration from the 
status quo to UBI is fraught with the risk 
that social welfare beneficiaries will be 
left with unmet needs as a result of this 
complex shift in approaches. Consider, 
for example, a person currently receiving 
benefits under the TANF and food 
stamp programs. If UBI is adopted the 
person would likely lose TANF and food 
stamp benefits under the approach 
described by Professor Howard and, in 
exchange, get $12,000 annually. 
Meanwhile, someone earning $500,000 
a year would also get $12,000 annually 
under this proposal. Neither outcome 
appears to make sense.
Converting from our current social 
welfare program to a UBI is an enor-
mous change, and the risk of program 
failure is borne entirely by the poor who 
would get a flat, defined-contribution 
cash payment on the one hand, but lose 
their existing social benefits safety net 
on the other. Proponents of UBI face a 
monumental challenge in persuading 
social welfare providers and recipients 
that we should dismantle our poverty 
safety net. Social welfare program 
managers and recipients will “fight 
tooth and nail” to keep programs in 
place (Hoar 2018). 
The biggest challenge facing UBI is 
not mentioned in the article, however: 
namely, that spending for this unprece-
dentedly expensive program would likely 
preempt funding for other proposed 
programs that enjoy perhaps even more 
public support than UBI. UBI would 
preempt funding for a national health 
insurance program, for example, which 
is a very expensive program. Some esti-
mates suggest that Bernie Sanders’s 
Medicare for All plan would cost $33 
trillion by 2031 (proponents of the plan 
say it would save $2 trillion). Spending 
for UBI could conflict with attempts to 
address the $1.5 trillion in college debt 
that burden graduates for decades after 
they leave school or with proposals for 
free college tuition, which could cost 
$70 billion each year, or with job-pro-
ducing infrastructure repairs ($2 tril-
lion), budget deficit reduction, or social 
security reform.2 
The issue of competing priorities is 
the greatest challenge faced by propo-
nents of UBI because it means they need 
to justify: (1) a historic government cost 
expenditure and (2) the reason UBI 
should be preferred over other worthy 
and well-supported programs competing 
for government funding. 
In my opinion, proposals to imple-
ment UBI nationwide face nearly insur-
mountable political, financial, and social 
hurdles. Moreover, the logistics of 
implementing UBI—whether the tran-
sition in which UBI replaces existing 
safety net programs or the mechanics of 
UBI financing—are overwhelmingly 
complex and have not been adequately 
explained in the commentary. Although 
preparing for potential future job losses, 
reducing precarity, and rewarding 
unpaid labor are all important issues 
that we need to address, other policy 
options, such as a negative income tax, 
could be as effective as UBI at addressing 
them. That said, well-developed and 
transparent localized experiments may 
be worth pursuing to gather data points 
on UBI and to inform the ongoing 
discussion. National UBI, however, is 
not ready for prime time.   -
ENDNOTES
1. CBO figures are available here: https://
www.cbo.gov/topics/budget; IRS figures 
are from the IRS Data Book: https://www.
irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax 
-stats-irs-data-book.
2. Information on the figures cited in this 
paragraph is from the following sources: 
Medicare for All: Jeff Stein, “Does Bernie 
Sanders’s Health Plan Cost $33 Trillion—
or Save $2 Trillion?” Washington Post (July 
31, 2018), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/; student 
loans: https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/zackfriedman/2018/06/13/student-loan 
-debt-statistics-2018/#4d07c5b7310f; free 
college tuition: https://www 
.sanders.senate.gov/download 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30 
/us/politics/trump-infrastructure-plan 
.html.
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Technological Change and Universal  
Basic Income: 
A Historical Review
by Daniel Soucier
Imagine being born in 1900. With great genes, avoidance of major diseases as well as industrial accidents, and a 
little bit of luck, you lived to see the year 2000. What 
technological changes did you experience over the course 
of your lifetime? You would have witnessed overwhelming 
developments in transportation, construction, manufac-
turing, and communication. Further, after the First World 
War, you would have watched as chemical, electrical, petro-
leum, and steel technologies revolutionizing workplaces 
and marketplaces. How did the workforce change? What 
careers were no longer viable? What jobs no longer existed? 
How many hundreds of millions of people were displaced 
due to technological change and increased automation?
As an instructor of history and Maine studies, I often 
hear students exclaim that the world is more “modern” than 
ever before, that the technological changes occurring since 
the dawning of the twenty-first century supersede all that 
have come throughout the history of humankind. That 
despite vast cultural, social, political, economic, and envi-
ronmental revolutions, the changes most significant to 
human history are the ones that have occurred during their 
lifetimes. However, eminent historians of technology 
Howard Segal and Alan Marcus argue that “the century 
after the 1830s [that] marked America’s technological 
heyday.” The technological changes that occurred from 
1830 to 1930 created vast social and cultural change in 
America. That change still permeates the United States 
today as “Americans...continue to live with and employ 
variants of technologies first developed more than a 
hundred years ago” (Marcus and Segal 1999: vii).
This perceived unprecedented rapidity of change 
occurring in one’s own lifetime is akin to the principal of 
shifting-baseline syndrome that occurred in fisheries 
management: instead of thinking about levels of oceanic 
biota before human exploitation as natural, individuals 
think about how fish stocks have changed during their 
lifetimes. Thus, each generation of fishermen and fishery 
scientists redefined what is normal, natural, or sustainable. 
In the past, policymakers relied on the anecdotes of those 
working the seas and the reports of biologists compiled 
from misinterpreted data resulting in disastrous conse-
quences. Oftentimes, the supporters of universal basic 
income fall victim to shifting-baseline syndrome as well. As 
Michael Howard points out “supporters of basic income…
worry that artificial intelligence and automation will 
displace more jobs than they will create necessitating new 
forms of income security for those who are displaced” 
(Howard 2018: 38). Indeed, the argument is that the 
changes wrought by artificial intelligence will be so great 
that Maine, the United States, and the world need to revo-
lutionize their social safety-net systems.
MAINE: A HISTORY OF DISPLACED PROFESSIONS.
The rise of artificial intelligence and increased automa-tion creates incredible workforce challenges. However, 
to think that this change is unique is ahistorical. In fact, 
since the revolution from an agrarian-based economy to an 
industrial-based economy, the recurrent fear has been that 
technological change will produce mass unemployment 
followed by social upheaval. Maine is an excellent case study 
for how disruptive technologies displace workers, but, in 
some cases, can create unforeseen economic opportunities.
By the mid-eighteenth century, Maine’s lumbering, 
shipbuilding, and fishing industries were among the top in 
the nation. The agricultural sector of the economy was the 
largest in New England. Ice-cutting employed tens of thou-
sands of workers and created more wealth in its peak years 
than the annual gold production in California. Maine also 
supplied the most granite in the country for curbing and 
paving and was second only to Massachusetts in granite 
supplied for the nation’s booming urban regions in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. However, these multimil-
lion-dollar industries were on the verge of collapse during 
the early twentieth century as the nation shifted from an 
economy based on wood, water, and muscle to one fueled 
by iron, coal, and rail. 
Railroads opened up the state of Maine and the rest of 
New England for the importation of agricultural products, 
manufactured goods, and natural resources from the 
western United States. This forced many of Maine farmers 
out of business or caused them to specialize in a single 
product such as potatoes, dairy, or hay. As overland ship-
ping became more efficient and the predominant construc-
tion materials for ships evolved from wood to iron or steel, 
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Maine’s shipbuilding industry also was forced to specialize 
or risk becoming extinct. Steel and rail also caused great 
decline in Maine’s granite industry. Buildings became 
constructed from steel and concrete and roads from 
macadam. Further, granite quarried from western states 
flooded the eastern market on rail cars reducing demand 
for Maine’s coastal granite. Finally, with the rise of electri-
fication and the ability to produce ice and cool foodstuffs 
artificially, Maine’s ice industry collapsed. Thus, the rise of 
rail and steel transformed Maine’s economic landscape.
However, the spread of interior railways and travel 
aboard steamships had unexpected consequences for the 
region. In the aftermath of the Civil War, industrial elites 
and middle-class professionals gained increased leisure 
time, and they looked to an extended pleasure periphery to 
escape the hassles of urban life. Hotels, cottages, restau-
rants, and other service industry establishments dotted the 
coast of Maine as well as inland lakes and resort communi-
ties. Mount Desert Island, Rangeley Lakes, and Moosehead 
Lake became destinations for hunting, fishing, camping, 
and cottaging. Early in the twentieth century, Maine began 
billing itself as the nation’s vacationland. Summer hotels, 
country inns, strip malls, factory outlets, summer camps, 
campgrounds, ski resorts, and expanded tourism commu-
nities were fueled by the variegated recreational opportuni-
ties available to visitors of the state. By the 1990s, visitors 
were spending over $2 billion, and tourism became one of 
Maine’s most important economic and cultural sectors. 
Today, tourism is Maine’s most vibrant industry generating 
$3.42 billion in revenue annually. In fact, visitors contribute 
one in five dollars to Maine’s economy, support one in six 
Maine jobs, and generate 20 percent of Maine’s gross state 
product. The same disruptive technologies that bank-
rupted much of Maine’s extractive resource industries 
directly laid the foundation for its new service economy. 
CONCLUSION
I certainly agree with Howard that “poverty is still 
with us [and] inequality is rising.” Indeed, I am no stranger 
to displaced workers in the face of a globalized economy, 
increased automation, and a changing workforce dynamic. 
I often joke with friends and colleagues that I earned my 
PhD in history because I am a fourth-generation paper-
maker who crafts papers intellectually instead of materially 
because my familial vocation no longer exists. Nearly the 
entirety of my immediate and extended family has experi-
enced job displacement and the benefits of our social 
welfare safety net. Despite a massive economic shift from 
an industrial-based economy to a service-based economy 
during the twentieth century, Maine’s unemployment rate 
as of August 2019 was 2.9 percent. Thus, I also agree with 
Howard that “we face new threats from technological 
change;” however, overhauling social programs that have 
been crafted through decades of experience with workforce 
displacement—where failure is the burden of those in 
society with the least amount of political, social, and 
economic resources—based upon the fact that technology 
is changing would be misguided policy (Howard 2018: 
40). It is clear that the transition will be painful; however, 
through innovation and persistence, Mainers will make it 
through this next economic and technological revolution.
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A Basic Income Guarantee Cannot Secure 
Either the Right to Work or Income Security 
Recognized in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights—
But There Is a Strategy That Can at Far Lower Cost
By Philip Harvey
As a human rights economist and lawyer, my work is dedicated to the development of public policy 
proposals capable of securing the economic and social rights 
recognized in international human rights agreements (UN 
OHCHR n.d.). From that perspective, the problem I have 
with universal basic income (UBI) guarantee proposals is 
that their advocates overstate their ability to secure the right 
to work and the right to income security recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN 
General Assembly 1948) while failing to acknowledge the 
opportunity cost of either the full or partial versions of the 
UBI guarantee they promote. 
INABILITY OF UBI GUARANTEE TO 
SECURE THE RIGHT TO WORK OR THE 
RIGHT TO INCOME SECURITY
The arguments Michael Howard (2018) proposes in favor of a UBI guarantee focus on the inability of 
market economies to secure various aspects of the right to 
work recognized in Article 23 of the UDHR. He cites three 
such failings—the threat of robotization to the economy’s 
ability to provide paid employment for all job wanters, 
the inadequate pay and precarity of a substantial portion 
of existing jobs, and the lack of compensation provided 
volunteer family care and community service workers. He 
suggests that a UBI guarantee would solve these problems. 
I have long argued that it would not (Harvey 2005, 2006, 
2008, 2013a, 2014). 
What UBI advocates fail to note is that the uniformity, 
universality, and unconditionality of a UBI guarantee 
prevents it from providing any compensation to persons 
who suffer involuntary unemployment, inadequate wages, 
or a lack of compensation for socially useful unpaid work. 
Consider two workers. Call them Mary and James. Both 
work at the same job, receive the same after-tax wages and 
the same untaxed UBI grant. If Mary is laid off, she will 
continue to receive the same UBI grant that James does. 
The only difference between them is that Mary will have 
lost 100 percent of her after-tax wage income without her 
UBI grant providing a penny of compensation for that 
loss—since she received the same UBI benefit in addition 
to her wage while she was employed, as John still does 
because he still has his job. Nor will Mary receive a penny 
of compensation from her UBI grant for any community 
service or family care work she performs—since her UBI 
grant would be the same whether or not she engages in any 
such work. Finally, the same would be true of low-wage 
workers, since they too would receive the same UBI grant 
regardless of how adequately or inadequately they were 
paid. This does not mean Mary’s UBI guarantee would be 
worthless. It would permit her to survive without a decent 
job, and that would undoubtedly be of value to her, but it 
wouldn’t secure her right to a decent job if she wanted one 
to supplement her UBI income or to be fairly compensated 
for the socially useful work she performed. 
Would her UBI guarantee secure her right to an 
adequate income guaranteed by Article 25 of the UDHR? 
That would depend on the level at which the UBI guar-
antee was set, whether it compensated for the possibly 
higher than average cost of living where she lived, whether 
it allowed for additional payments based on any exceptional 
needs she might have (due to a disability, for example), and 
whether it was adequate to secure the right (also recognized 
in Article 25) to “security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond [her] control.” 
I think it’s clear that a UBI guarantee would fail to 
satisfy all these conditions. On the other hand, there’s no 
reason why a single program should be expected to do so. 
The problem with a UBI guarantee is that the opportunity 
cost of providing such a guarantee—whether at a full or 
partial level—is so high that it would preclude the provi-
sion of other social welfare benefits needed to fully realize 
not just the right to work and an adequate income, but all 
of the economic and social rights recognized in the UDHR.
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THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF 
PROVIDING A UBI GUARANTEE
Opportunity cost is an economic concept that measures the value of the choices we make by comparing them 
to the alternative choices we forgo. No policy proposal 
should be rejected on the grounds that it only partially 
fulfills a human rights mandate, but it should be rejected 
if other policies would do a better job of fulfilling those 
mandates at lower cost. In general, the greater the cost of 
a policy proposal, the greater its opportunity cost, and this 
is certainly true of UBI guarantee proposals. 
In the United States, a UBI guarantee matching the 
official poverty threshold for one person households would 
cost about $3.7 trillion in 2019 while generating no more 
than about $400 billion in savings from reductions in 
existing means-tested social welfare benefits. The net cost 
of such a program, (about $3.3 trillion) would require an 
increase in federal spending from its current $4.4 trillion 
level to $7.7 trillion. 
A UBI guarantee based on the 60 percent of median 
income threshold used by the European Union to count 
persons “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” (Eurostat 
2019) would cost about twice as much while generating 
about 1 trillion in savings from the elimination of virtually 
all means-tested social welfare benefits, including most 
Medicaid and SCHIP benefits. With a net cost of about 
$6.4 trillion, this more generous (and arguably more 
adequate) UBI guarantee would require an increase in 
federal spending from its current $4.4 trillion level to 
$10.8 trillion.
These figures are daunting, but the point I want to 
make is not that a full UBI guarantee is currently unattain-
able. I think it’s fair to say that UBI advocates who have 
studied the issue in depth concede that it is (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 133–169). The point I want to make 
is that the opportunity cost of providing a UBI guarantee 
argues against the adoption of either a full or partial 
guarantee. 
Before arguing that point, though, I want to comment 
on the claim advanced by many UBI advocates that the 
cost of a UBI guarantee shown above (its budgeted cost less 
savings attributable to reductions in social welfare benefits 
replaced by the guarantee) is not the relevant measure of its 
cost for purposes of policy assessment. They argue that the 
more relevant measure is the net redistributional effect of a 
UBI guarantee—the amount of income that would actu-
ally be transferred from wealthier to less wealthy members 
of society after the netting out of UBI grants against addi-
tional tax liabilities linked to the program. They refer to 
this redistributive effect as a UBI guarantee’s “net cost.” 
José Noguera (2018) has discussed the conceptual prob-
lems with this argument. Because of space limitations, I 
will merely add that the argument is about how people 
should think and feel about the cost of a UBI guarantee 
rather than what a government would have to pay out of 
its treasury to fund such a benefit. That cost is accurately 
reflected in the above figures and is not in dispute. 
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY 
Assessing the opportunity cost of a policy proposal requires the identification of possible alternatives to 
it. The alternative I have long advocated (Harvey 1989) 
is specifically targeted at securing the right to work and 
income security recognized in the UDHR by means of a 
two-legged strategy originally proposed by New Deal social 
welfare planners (CES 1935). As originally conceived, the 
first leg of the strategy called for the federal government 
to provide “employment assurance” to all able-bodied 
adults backed up by a promise of “public employment for 
those…whom industry cannot employ at a given time.” 
The second leg of their strategy called for the federal 
government, in cooperation with the states, to provide 
truly adequate, nonstigmatizing income transfers to those 
members of society who were either unable or not expected 
to be self-supporting.
The first leg of this strategy was successfully tested, 
though not fully implemented, in programs like the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) (Harvey 2013b). Work on the 
second leg of the strategy was commenced in the 1930s 
and has advanced considerably since then in the develop-
ment non-means-tested programs like Social Security 
(OASDI) and means-tested programs like Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI). 
Add to this two-legged strategy a similar commitment 
to secure everyone’s right to education and healthcare, and 
you have a four-legged policy capable of securing all of the 
most costly economic and social entitlements recognized in 
the UDHR. Call them the HEWI rights—health care, 
education, work and income security. 
It is important to note, however, that the ability of this 
four-legged policy to achieve its human rights goals 
depends on the realization of all four HEWI rights. They 
are interdependent, and a failure to secure any of them 
would undermine the entire strategy. Today, inadequate 
funding and structural inequities stand in our way of 
securing everyone’s right to health care, education, and 
income security, but human rights advocates at least have a 
credible strategy for securing those three rights. What’s 
missing is a credible strategy for securing the right to work 
(Harvey 2007). That’s the gap an updated version of the 
New Deal’s employment assurance strategy could fill, and 
legislation embodying that strategy has been introduced in 
Congress (H.R. 1000). 
At an average cost of $320 billion per year, H.R. 1000 
would cost only 5 percent to 10 percent as much as a UBI 
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guarantee—before taking into account the additional tax 
revenues and savings in other social welfare programs a job 
guarantee would generate. Add a few hundred billion 
dollars to the budgets of a select set of income-transfer 
programs, and we could also guarantee a truly adequate 
minimum income for everyone who is either unable or not 
expected to be self-supporting. In short, for 10 percent to 
20 percent of what a UBI guarantee would cost (depending 
on the level of the guarantee) it would be possible to 
achieve what a UBI guarantee cannot—the substantial 
realization of the right to work and income security recog-
nized in the UDHR.
Moreover, since the benefits provided by a partial UBI 
guarantee would be proportionate to its cost, a partial 
guarantee costing the same as the employment assurance 
and income security strategy described above would 
provide a UBI grant of only about $2,500 a year—a little 
more than $200 a month. Stated differently, the opportu-
nity cost of providing a UBI guarantee of $200 a month at 
a cost of about $600 billion a year would be to forego the 
chance of guaranteeing a decent job for everyone who 
wants one and an adequate income for everyone who 
either cannot or is not expected to be self-supporting. That 
opportunity cost is far too high, in my view, to justify a 
partial UBI guarantee, and the same assessment applies to 
a full UBI guarantee. That’s why I oppose UBI guarantee 
proposals of the sort advocated by the Basic Income 
Guarantee Network (BIEN n.d.) and Michael Howard. A 
UBI guarantee that was integrated into the UDHR 
strategy described above by providing a means-tested UBI 
benefit to persons who could be self-supporting but elected 
not to seek paid employment would be another proposi-
tion (Harvey 2005: 43–45). 
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Deceptively Simple: 
The Uselessness of Gross Cost in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Universal Basic Income
by Georg Arndt and Karl Widerquist
The gross cost of universal basic income (UBI) is a deceptively simple concept: the size of the UBI times 
the size of the population.1 The net cost of UBI is more 
difficult to calculate: it is the amount of money the UBI 
transfers from one group of people (net contributors) to 
another group of people (net beneficiaries) plus any asso-
ciated transaction costs. 
The difference between these two concepts came up in 
a pair of recent Maine Policy Review commentaries by 
Dave Canarie and Michael Howard. Canarie responds to 
Howard’s argument that gross cost is not very meaningful 
by simply asserting “but of course it is,” with little or no 
argument to back it up (Canarie 2019: 76). 
This article demonstrates that, despite Canarie’s asser-
tion, gross cost is a misleading concept that does not reflect 
the actual cost to society of a UBI scheme, mainly because 
gross costs do not account for the substantial amounts of 
UBI that people pay to themselves. It neither benefits nor 
costs you anything if the government both adds and 
subtracts a dollar to and from your bank account—even if 
the addition is called “UBI” and the subtraction is called a 
“tax.” The difference between what you pay and what you 
receive determines whether and by how much you benefit 
from or pay for a UBI. This difference is the net cost. It is 
the true cost of UBI because it reflects how much one 
group of people has to sacrifice and 
how much another group benefits. 
The gross cost can easily be three-
to-six times larger than the net cost 
of UBI, and therefore, it can be an 
extremely misleading representation 
of the cost of UBI (Widerquist 
2017).
To illustrate the difference, 
consider the following stylised 
society with two individuals—one 
of them (Net Beneficiary) is unem-
ployed while the other (Net 
Contributor) receives an annual 
market income of $40,000. Suppose 
there is a simple means-tested 
benefit system under which 
Beneficiary receives $10,000 while 
Contributor does not receive 
anything. This program has a gross (and net) cost of 
$10,000. To cover this cost, the state taxes Contributor 
(e.g., through an income tax of 25 percent). In the resulting 
distribution, Beneficiary has a disposable income of 
$10,000 while Contributor retains a disposable income of 
$30,000. This example is illustrated in Figure 1.
The same distribution of disposable income can be 
achieved with a UBI of $10,000 payable to everyone. Such 
a scheme would have a gross cost of $20,000 or double the 
means-tested system because both Beneficiary and 
Contributor receive the UBI of $10,000 on paper. To 
finance this scheme, the government could impose, for 
example, an income tax of 50 percent on Contributor, 
taxing away $20,000 of their market income. In total, 
however, this UBI scheme leads to the same income distri-
bution as the means-tested system above: Beneficiary ends 
up with $10,000 and Contributor retains $30,000. There is 
no difference between the financial costs and benefits to the 
two parties even though the gross cost is twice as high. In 
contrast, the net cost of the UBI scheme remains $10,000—
the same as the cost of the means-tested program—
reflecting the similarity of the costs and benefits of the two 
programs. This similarity in outcomes is illustrated in 
Figure 2.
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In addition to the amount payable, the difference 
between gross and net cost is also affected by the tax rate 
on net beneficiaries. Very few UBI net beneficiaries have 
zero private income and pay zero taxes. When they do pay 
taxes, they pay some of the cost of their own UBI. To illus-
trate this, consider the same example as above; but now 
Beneficiary receives an additional market income of 
$6,000. Depending on the income tax rate for Beneficiary 
(which effectively serves as a withdrawal rate for the UBI), 
the net cost of the scheme will vary while the gross cost will 
remain at $20,000. In the example above, setting the 
income tax rate for Beneficiary at 33 percent would imply 
a net cost of $8,660 to be borne by Contributor.2
The income tax rate for net beneficiaries not only 
impacts the net cost of the scheme, it also sets the break-
even point at which individuals move from being net 
beneficiaries to being net contributors. Extending the 
example from the previous paragraph, an income tax rate 
of 33 percent for net beneficiaries sets the break-even point 
at a market income of $30,000.3
Considering net beneficiaries’ tax rate also illustrates 
one of the main advantages of the net cost perspective over 
the gross cost perspective: it allows us to investigate distri-
butional effects within the UBI scheme. If we increase the 
tax rate on net beneficiaries, people reach the break-even 
point sooner; there will be fewer net beneficiaries; the cost 
of UBI decreases; and more net contributors would be 
available to share that cost. Therefore, the financial burden 
on each of the net contributors would also decrease. 
Similarly, if we decrease the tax rate, the net benefit and net 
cost increase; there are more net beneficiaries; and fewer 
net contributors to pay the cost. 
The gross cost of UBI is inde-
pendent of the tax rate on net bene-
ficiaries, and therefore it cannot 
capture any of these changes or 
contribute to a discussion of them. 
Therefore, it is unable to capture the 
distributional effects of the UBI 
scheme. Cost figures for distribu-
tional programs are meaningless if 
they cannot show what the financial 
burden is or who remains to bear 
that burden after beneficiaries are 
accounted for. 
To the extent that Canarie 
elaborates on his statement that 
gross cost is “of course” meaningful, 
he writes that the government does 
have to raise the taxes to pay for the 
whole UBI. This statement is true 
only in the narrowest sense. While 
nominally the cost of a UBI scheme 
corresponds to its gross cost, this 
cost figure reflects neither the scheme’s cost to society nor 
its effect on the disposable income of net contributors. The 
government increases taxes, but gives the money back, 
making that portion of the tax increase costless. Fouksman 
and Saxe (2019) offer a mathematical proof that the 
marginal tax rates needed to support UBI are identical to 
those necessary to support an otherwise equivalent means-
tested negative income tax scheme. Because gross cost 
reveals nothing about the total tax burden or the marginal 
tax rates necessary to support a UBI scheme, it adds 
nothing meaningful to any conversation about UBI.
Unless one wants to exaggerate the cost of UBI to 
make it seem unattainable, the primary allure of the gross 
cost lies in its simplicity. The net cost of UBI is far more 
difficult to calculate (doing so involves specifying tax rates 
and looking at their effects on people at all levels of income 
and wealth). But this additional complexity is necessary, 
because as this article has demonstrated, any meaningful 
cost-benefit analysis of UBI has to consider the true finan-
cial cost of the UBI (who is financially harmed by the 
transition and by how much) or the true financial benefit 
of UBI (who financially gains from the transition to UBI). 
Only the net cost can tell us something meaningful for this 
comparison. 
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ENDNOTES
1 If the UBI grant differs between adults and children, the 
gross cost is (still very simply) the number of adults times the 
UBI for adults plus the number of children times the UBI for 
children.
2 It is important to point out that, when integrating a UBI 
scheme into an existing social security system, this addi-
tional income tax for net beneficiaries would be levied on top 
of any other tax burden net beneficiaries are already facing.
3 At a market income of $30,000 and a beneficiary’s tax rate 
of 33 percent, the beneficiary would contribute exactly their 
own UBI of $10,000 and would consequently break even on 
the scheme.
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Restoring the Social Contract: 
The Challenge of Meeting Maine Residents Basic Needs
by Luisa Deprez
Millions of Americans and tens of thousands of Mainers are able to meet their most basic needs—food, 
shelter, health care, heat—only with the help of govern-
ment programs when their income falls short. This support 
has been foundational to the American political system 
since Thomas Jefferson embedded the social contract—
Americans rights—into the Declaration of Independence. 
“Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” established an 
implicit agreement among members of society to cooperate 
for their mutual benefit; social investment was essential to 
securing the mutual protection and well-being of the citi-
zenry, to ensuring a sound and vibrant democracy. 
Today, economic inequality is at a 50-year high.1 
Millions are unable to eke out a living putting themselves, 
their children, and the nation in a precarious and untenable 
position. And current federal attacks on safety-net programs 
reveal swiftly eroding government supports, destined to 
leave more people even worse off than they are now. 
Maine’s economy has had a rocky decade. During the 
2008–2009 recession, Maine lost over 30,000 payroll jobs 
mostly in the manufacturing, construction, and retail 
sectors of the economy, and it was among the last of the 
states to recover. The recovery that did occur resulted in an 
increase primarily in service-sector jobs—jobs that rarely 
offer benefits and usually few opportunities for advance-
ment. Recent analyses from the Department of Labor 
projects a flat growth rate over the next 10 years. In a state 
with a 13 percent poverty rate, this is sobering news. 
Mainers are hard-working, self-reliant individuals. But 
even those with full-time jobs struggle to earn enough to 
put healthy and adequate food on the table, house their 
families, and keep themselves and their families warm and 
healthy. Among Mainers, as is the case nationally, 50 
percent of residents are just $500 away from an emergency, 
and over 40 percent cannot handle an unexpected $400 
expense in a given year.2 In addition, a shortage of 20,086 
affordable and available rental homes for the 40,839 
extremely low-income households in the state leaves too 
many forced to decide which of their basic needs are more 
important than the others as they struggle to keep eviction 
at bay.3 Maine’s average median household income 
($53,024) is now about $10,000 below the national average 
($63,179).4 Income is just not keeping up with the basic 
needs of too many Maine families. 
Relying on social safety-net programs to meet basic 
fundamental needs is no one’s first choice. But if safety-net 
programs are eliminated or so severely restricted that they 
are unusable by the people who need them, then what?
The discussion of how to meet the basic needs of the 
citizenry could not have come at a more timely moment 
both statewide and nationally. As we near a crisis of unprec-
edented despair, the questions for Maine right now are, 
how does the state ensure fundamental support, especially 
for its most vulnerable citizens? What long-range strategy 
can reduce poverty and lessen economic and racial inequality 
to ensure a more stable, secure populace?
POVERTY AND PROSPECTS FOR 
RECOVERY IN MAINE
Maine is by no means a wealthy state: 12.55 percent of citizens (approximately 163,000) are poor, 14 
percent of children in the state are poor.5 While data 
recently released by the US Census Bureau report a 
minuscule decrease in the national poverty rate, the Maine 
rate actually increased slightly from 2017 to 2018.6 US 
Census Bureau data also shows Maine as having the largest 
percentage drop in median household income in the 
United States—a 3.3 percent drop since 2017.7 Living with 
any degree of certainty or security at poverty level ($25,750 
for a family of four or $12,490 for a single person) is nigh 
impossible. 
Further adding to Maine’s challenge to secure stability 
for its citizens are the wide variations within the state; here 
averages often mean little.8 When the numbers are broken 
down by age, race, and geography, inequality immediately 
surfaces. In York County, for instance, the poverty rate for 
children under five was 7 percent in 2016, below the state-
wide average of 19.1 percent and the national rate of 21.3 
percent. But in Aroostook County, more than a third—37 
percent—of very young children live in a household where 
the income is below poverty level.9 Sharp regional dispari-
ties in childhood poverty are also evident between congres-
sional districts: 9 percent in the 1st congressional district 
and 20 percent in the 2nd district.10 These sharp disparities 
are also evident among race: the poverty rate among black 
children (53 percent) is more than three times the rate for 
non-Hispanic white children (15 percent) and twice as high 
as that of Hispanic children (25 percent) in Maine. For 
American Indian children in Maine, the rate stands at 40.6 
percent.11 
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The decline in manufacturing also presents consider-
able challenges as it has increased numbers of prime-age 
males out of work and lowered family incomes. While 
recent reports show an increase in the number of single 
mothers entering the workforce, they are doing so with 
limited education and limited help from rapidly fraying 
safety-net programs. They often enter low-wage jobs that 
offer little, or often no, opportunities for advancement and 
few, if any, benefits. Estimates are that nationally 41 
percent of women are breadwinners; in Maine 48 percent 
are—the seventh highest rate in the country.12 And wage 
gaps are still solidly evident between male and female 
workers. 
Labor force participation, the measure of the number 
of people either working or actively looking for work, has 
also begun to slip in parts of Maine. In what economists 
would consider a full-employment economy, an estimated 
20,000 Maine workers are officially unemployed. A more 
expansive definition used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
estimates that over 35,000 Maine workers are discouraged 
from seeking work because of repeated refusals to hire, 
health conditions, prison records, and various other forms 
of discrimination or are working in part-time employment 
but seeking full time work. And the lack of affordable child 
care makes it especially tough for Mainers—particularly in 
rural parts of the state—to work at all.13
While indicators such as rates of employment and 
GDP growth are readily held up as measures of economic 
stability and growth, they also obscure the fact that 
millions of Americans are barely getting by in today’s struc-
turally unequal economy. Maine Center for Economic 
Policy (MECEP) data14 shows that seven of the ten state 
senate districts with the highest percentage of households 
receiving food assistance, for example, experienced nega-
tive economic growth over the past twelve years. The types 
of economic opportunities that can sustain families and 
lead individuals on a path to self-sufficiency are simply not 
available in many of these areas because of economic dislo-
cation, globalization, and the decline of good-paying 
manufacturing jobs. The households in these areas rely 
disproportionately on social safety-net programs. And if, as 
the Trump administration has proposed, those programs 
are decimated, then what? 
HOW DOES MAINE ADDRESS THIS CHALLENGE? 
Only a few policy ideas have the potential to disrupt the inequality gap and ensure a greater degree of 
equity. Among them are a direct cash payment system and 
other direct cash benefit programs, tax rebates and credits, 
universal basic income and unconditional cash transfers to 
state residents, expanded safety net programs, child care 
and food supplement programs, and the like. 
One option now on the table is universal basic income 
(UBI). First introduced in the 1960s by President Richard 
Nixon, it is not, contrary to popular belief, a new idea. 
UBI has gained attention in policy circles, and field 
demonstrations have been mounted worldwide including 
in Alaska; Ontario; Finland; Stockton, California; and 
Jackson, Mississippi. Its promise, as a route for Maine to 
consider, will depend on how it is presented, how it is 
designed, and what the public narrative is. 
Experts who have studied UBI for decades say that if 
everyone had a sound, reliable economic floor and did not 
have to worry about meeting the bare necessities, we would 
see healthy communities. Communities where people 
don’t have to work themselves to death, with decreased 
levels of stress and anxiety and increased levels of health 
and mental health, higher levels of civic engagement, and 
better-performing citizens. Overall, we would see a 
more-prosperous, highly functional, educated, healthy, and 
diverse society.
In Stockton, California, for example, an expert team 
is investigating an array of potential outcomes from work 
efforts to health, civic engagement to financial wellbeing. 
Implicit in their pilot is the idea that individuals can be 
trusted to make the best financial decisions for themselves 
and their families. The idea is to provide an income floor 
so people can actually raise themselves up, use it as a 
springboard to lessen the effects of deep-rooted racial and 
economic inequalities. 
As someone who has devoted her work, teaching, 
scholarship, and service to poverty reduction and resolu-
tion for over 50 years now, I embraced Nixon’s portion of 
a universal basic income when few others did. I have 
certainly not abandoned it as a sound public policy; it is 
worthy of the utmost attention. Its weightiness arises when 
we consider its implementation and assess its cost: Would 
or should income limits be imposed on participants, and if 
so, how would they be determined? How should partici-
pants be identified? Must citizenship be a requirement for 
participation? Should safety-net programs now in place be 
abolished or significantly reduced? Where does the money 
to fund it come from? How should the wealth gap be 
considered in determining individual allocations? Should 
there be an established national minimum amount for each 
person or does this decision get turned over to the states? 
As ideological divides become sharper and as history would 
remind us, the negative ramifications of this latter approach 
have been devastating. 
And lest we forget, there are the irreverent voices of 
naysayers who attach themselves to mythical, unsubstanti-
ated notions of deservedness, hard work, and personal 
responsibility. As they endlessly raise concerns about lazi-
ness, irresponsible behavior, and dependency, their opin-
ions permeate and disrupt the political discourse—as they 
have for decades—despite the plethora of studies, research, 
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and data that belie their claims. But they, too, are a force 
to be reckoned with—and educated—as these conversa-
tions begin. 
Importantly though, we have in front of us a big idea 
that we must now de-risk. Meeting basic human needs is 
at stake. Above all else, any effort to secure basic needs for 
Maine citizens must do no harm; the poorest among us 
must not be made any worse off than they already are.  
To this end, we would be remiss in continuing to 
reject UBI as a serious policy, singly or coupled with other 
policies, which might ensure the stability of Maine citi-
zens. We cannot once again fail in upholding the tenets of 
the social contract. The contention that it is “not yet ready 
for prime time” fails to consider that income inequality is 
growing dramatically, and to date, no other set of programs 
has yet worked particularly well. 
Moving people out of poverty toward self-sufficiency 
and financial stability is a goal we can all agree on. How to 
best provide the support people need to meet the demands 
of daily living—that is the question. The newly established 
Committee to Study the Feasibility of Creating Basic 
Income Security is Maine’s opportunity to answer that 
question. It will be a challenging task, but through a 
rigorous review of the literature on basic needs and UBI, as 
well as an analysis of current research, data, and best prac-
tices, it can provide the state with a pathway by which it 
can secure the basic needs of Maine residents. Bringing the 
state closer to ensuring that the basic needs of its residents 
are met will be a laudable and vital contribution. 
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The Ethical Commitment of a Universal 
Basic Income
by Almaz Zelleke
Michael Howard’s (2018) brief commentary presents several arguments in favor of a universal basic income 
and describes the ways it could be implemented at the 
state level. The objections to basic income argued by Dave 
Canarie (2019) center on its high cost, its effect on current 
safety-net programs, and the possibility that its cost will 
crowd out other proposed and worthy programs, including 
national health insurance, college-debt forgiveness or free 
tuition, infrastructure spending, and so on. Canarie reason-
ably asks why, even if one accepts Howard’s diagnosis of the 
problem—the possibility of significant job losses through 
automation, the inability of many jobs to guarantee 
economic security, or as a way to compensate caregivers for 
their critical but often unpaid labor—basic income should 
be preferred to more traditional targeted, means-tested, and 
conditional income-support programs.
Like Howard, I believe that the core features of a basic 
income make it a better social welfare policy than the ones 
we have in place. Because basic income is universal, rather 
than limited to those who prove their financial need, it 
means that none of the needy fall through the cracks 
between different social policy programs. Because it is 
unconditional, rather than limited to those who are able to 
work in paid jobs, other contributions to society are recog-
nized and supported. And because basic income is an indi-
vidual, flat, and additive benefit rather than a benefit scaled 
to household size and income, it provides the same benefit, 
rather than smaller incremental benefits, to additional 
family or household members. This means that individuals 
are incentivized to take steps that increase economic secu-
rity, like marrying or combining households, or taking 
part-time or intermittent work where full-time work is 
unavailable or impractical.
These important policy advantages do increase the cost 
of basic income, as Canarie points out, but the cost can be 
minimized by taxing back the basic income from those 
whose income or wealth is high enough that they don’t 
need it. While it may seem pointless to provide a basic 
income with one hand and tax it away with the other, doing 
so more effectively targets benefits to those who need them, 
especially those whose incomes fluctuate enough from 
month to month that they cycle in and out of eligibility for 
traditional welfare benefits. Those whose incomes are high 
enough not to need the basic income can forego the cash 
and take the benefit as a credit against the taxes they owe.
A universal, but taxable, basic income has another 
advantage: it makes the ethical commitment of a basic 
income explicit: that everyone in a wealthy, democratic 
society should have access to the means necessary for a 
healthy and productive life, and that those who can afford 
to contribute more to our collective economic security 
should do so, just as they contribute more to other forms of 
collective security through our progressive tax system. Basic 
income is unapologetically redistributive and should be 
defended as such: it only makes sense in a society whose 
economic systems leads to inequality and insecurity, because 
a society with an egalitarian distribution of income and 
wealth has no need for a basic income. Our capitalist 
economic system allows some individuals to privatize, accu-
mulate, and monopolize economic resources to which 
others are denied access and to pass those resources down 
to their heirs, entrenching inequality through the genera-
tions. It is this kind of economy that gives rise to insecurity 
and inequality for large proportions of the population, even 
as it may promote overall growth and national prosperity. 
Redistributing part of this prosperity as a basic income is a 
way to fulfill the implicit promise that allowing privatiza-
tion provides economic benefits for all, not just the few.
Canarie writes persuasively about the contributions 
middle-class workers make to their own success in Maine, 
but can hard work really explain the difference between the 
average income of the top 1 percent of Mainers—over 
$650,000—and the bottom 99%—around $43,00 
(Sommellier and Price 2018)? Or the likely divergence in 
the future success of the almost 17 percent of children 
living in poverty in Maine compared to those living in 
households with above average income (US Census Bureau 
2017)? If you think that it can, you’re unlikely to be 
convinced of the need for a basic income. If you think that 
something other than hard work explains at least some of 
the variation in our economic success, and that an effective 
form of redistribution is necessary to help level the playing 
field for all Americans, you might be open to the idea of a 
basic income, but remain unconvinced that it is affordable 
or feasible at the state or local level. Could Maine imple-
ment a basic income on its own?
A full basic income at a level targeted to lift individuals 
or families above the federal poverty threshold is probably 
beyond the fiscal capacity of a state like Maine. States face 
limitations in enacting the kinds of redistributive taxation 
that could fund a generous basic income. Tax competition 
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with adjoining states imposes limits on how high income 
taxes can go without driving the most mobile—likely the 
wealthiest—taxpayers across the border. Taxes on financial 
wealth, which are being proposed by some Democratic 
presidential candidates, are even harder to impose at the 
state level. Taxes on real property—houses and land, which 
can’t be moved—can be adjusted to raise more revenue 
from the wealthy and be redistributed within the state as a 
land dividend. Regardless of the form of the tax, it is crit-
ical to build support for the basic income to make it 
durable across successive administrations, as there is little 
benefit to a basic income that lasts for a few years and is 
repealed.
To build support for a basic income, it may help to 
fund an incremental basic income, starting with the most 
sympathetic recipients—children and the elderly—with a 
dedicated tax. A universal child allowance, as Howard 
suggests, is a good place to begin, although its universality 
should mean that it goes to most families, not that it can’t 
be taxed back from the wealthiest families; what is 
important is that poor and middle-class families don’t have 
to document their income and assets before receiving it. 
Next could be supplementing federal benefits like 
Supplemental Security Income (for the elderly poor) up to 
a decent level above the poverty threshold. Finally, Maine 
could supplement TANF federal benefits for the work-
ing-aged poor, which now come with so many restrictions 
that the program fails to reach most of the poor. An uncon-
ditional, universal (but taxable for the wealthy) cash 
benefit of even a modest amount helps to eliminate the 
poverty trap of a life on meager welfare benefits or a life on 
low earnings by allowing for both to be combined and can 
support work by helping to pay for child care, transporta-
tion, training, or education. Eventually, these three benefits 
could be combined into a flat and universal basic income.
Dedicated taxation for its financing coupled with 
taxing back benefits received by the wealthy mimics the 
structure of our most successful economic security 
program, Social Security, which is responsible for drasti-
cally reducing elderly poverty. It is likely that the imple-
mentation of a basic income will likewise follow Social 
Security’s path—initially a small benefit, limited to only a 
portion of the population, with a gradual expansion of its 
tax base, eligible beneficiaries, and benefit level. For Social 
Security, state-level implementation, not piloting, was the 
spur to federal implementation. Pilots, which are neces-
sarily small and short term, can’t demonstrate the commu-
nity effects of raising everyone’s income, or the shift to 
long-term planning encouraged by an ongoing income 
boost. As with Social Security, our best chance to get basic 
income onto the national legislative agenda may be 
through its adoption in a few forward-thinking states.
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Universal Basic Income Roundtable—
Response to Critics
by Michael Howard
I begin by thanking Maine Policy Review for organizing this forum and for this opportunity to reply to the 
other contributors. Given the limitations of space, my 
remarks will be selective, and I cannot do justice to all the 
contributions. 
THE REAL COST OF A UBI 
Both Dave Canarie (2019) and Philip Harvey (2019) object to the alleged prohibitively high cost of UBI. 
Arndt and Widerquist (2019) have adequately explained 
the distinction between gross cost and net cost. The gross 
cost is misleading because it does “not account for the 
substantial amounts of UBI that people pay to themselves. 
It neither benefits nor costs you anything if the govern-
ment both adds and subtracts a dollar to and from your 
bank account—even if the addition is called ‘UBI’ and 
the subtraction is called a ‘tax.’” What matters is who 
benefits and who loses after the UBI is subtracted from 
the increased taxes, and this can only be known when the 
relevant tax rates are specified so that it is clear who is a net 
beneficiary and who is a net contributor. This net cost is in 
the range of one-third to one-sixth of the gross cost (Arndt 
and Widerquist 2019). 
Harvey favors a jobs program instead of a UBI, but he 
acknowledges that this will not suffice to bring everyone 
out of poverty. Since both he and Canarie speak favorably 
of a negative income tax (NIT) as a better way to address 
poverty than a UBI, let us compare them.1 Both are forms 
of guaranteed minimum income. Let us assume, for the 
sake of illustration, that the goal is to ensure that annually 
no adult has an income less than $12,000 and no child an 
income less than $6,000.
A UBI achieves this simply by giving every adult 
$12,000 and every child $6,000 annually, typically in 
monthly payments. A NIT achieves this goal by topping up 
income to the level of $12,000, typically in a lump sum 
after the individual files a tax return. An individual earning 
nothing would receive the full $12,000. The benefit phases 
out as one earns income, but it is important not to disin-
centivize labor, so it should not phase out by $1 for every 
dollar earned. Workers would then have nothing to gain 
from their first $12,000 in earnings and would in effect be 
facing the equivalent of 100 percent marginal tax rates. 
So let’s suppose that the phase out rate is 50 percent. 
For each dollar earned, the worker loses 50 cents of his 
NIT. Thus a worker earning $6,000 in gross income loses 
$3,000 of the NIT, but has a net total income of $15,000. 
The NIT ensures that the worker does not fall below the 
poverty line, and the phase-out ensures that the worker 
benefits from employment. There is no benefit cliff or 
poverty trap. The benefit phases out entirely only when 
the worker earns $24,000 or more in wages (let’s call that 
the break-even point). People earning above this amount 
are net contributors to the scheme; how much a given 
person pays will depend on the tax rates and forms of 
taxation. 
There is nothing special about a benefit phase-out rate 
of 50 percent. If this rate is considered too high, then a 
lower rate could be used. A lower rate would raise the 
break-even point and extend the benefit further into the 
middle class, but it would also increase the total cost to the 
net contributors, those paying taxes above the break-even 
point.  
The cost of such a NIT scheme to guarantee that every 
adult receives no less than $12,000 and every child no less 
than $6000 annually would be about $539 billion, the 
same as what I have called the net cost of a UBI (2015 
figures). That’s about one-sixth the gross cost of a UBI, 
because NIT payments do not go to everyone, only to those 
below the break-even point. As Canarie rightly notes, it 
would have about the same effect as a UBI on the incomes 
of the poor, precarious workers, and those engaged in 
unpaid home care. So why even consider a UBI? First, the 
difference in cost is largely an illusion (Arndt and Widerquist 
2019; Widerquist 2017; Santens 2017). Second, there are 
distinct advantages to a UBI over a means-tested NIT.
Recall that for the UBI, as for the NIT, there will be 
net beneficiaries—people who receive more from the UBI 
than they pay in taxes toward the scheme—and net 
contributors—people who pay more toward the UBI 
scheme than they receive from it. So to take Canarie’s 
example of the person who makes $500,000 and still gets a 
UBI of $12,000—an outcome that “appears [not] to make 
sense”—that person will pay more than $12,000 in addi-
tional taxes to support the UBI scheme. The “enormous” 
increase in taxes of $12,000 is illusory because it is canceled 
out by the UBI. The only real tax increase is what is needed 
to bring everyone up to the poverty line. And it is about the 
same as would be needed for a NIT. The worker making 
$6,000 in gross income keeps all of the $12,000 in basic 
income, but pays a tax surcharge of 50 percent toward the 
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UBI out of earned income, with a net income of $15,000. 
Her situation is financially identical to that of the worker 
receiving a NIT that phases out at a 50 percent rate. And 
again, there is nothing special about a 50 percent tax 
surcharge. It could be lower, raising the break-even point 
and extending the net benefit further into the middle class 
(for details, see Widerquist 2017). But then it will cost 
more for the net contributors. (An important point that 
Canarie misses is that this tax surcharge is only for the net 
beneficiaries, not all taxpayers. The tax rates on net 
contributors will vary depending on tax rates, how progres-
sive these are, whether the tax is on income, or wealth, or 
consumption). The main takeaway is that the costs to the 
net contributors for a UBI and for a NIT are about the 
same.
Now, consider the advantages of a UBI: 
1. Everyone gets it, in the form of a monthly check 
or bank deposit. A NIT will go only to those 
who file a tax return. This may seem like a small 
hurdle for people to jump over for free money, 
but one of the major failures of the modern 
welfare state is lack of uptake in benefits by 
those who need them. For example, nearly a 
quarter of people eligible for food stamps do 
not apply for them (Delaney 2013). Part of 
this reluctance is due to stigma, and perhaps a 
NIT would remove enough of the stigma that 
attaches to food stamps and other cash benefits 
to improve the uptake, but a UBI would likely 
do better. 
2. A UBI is there when you need it. When 
someone loses a job, the UBI still reliably comes 
in. A NIT would need to be applied for, and 
in most NIT schemes, one would need to wait 
until the end of the year when filing taxes to 
receive it (although a NIT could be designed to 
be paid in advance, monthly, based on estimated 
earnings). 
3. Universal benefits are more popular than 
targeted benefits, so much so that universal 
benefits, which one would expect to be spread 
more thinly than targeted benefits, often 
benefit the poor more than targeted benefits, 
because the latter are resisted by the rest of 
the population. Thus Medicare, public educa-
tion, and Social Security are well funded, but 
TANF benefits do not keep pace with inflation 
(Burnside and Floyd 2019). 
4. It is possible that a UBI would be cheaper to 
administer. On the one hand, a NIT would 
not require collecting the additional taxes, 
and distributing checks or bank deposits to 
everyone. But on the other hand, means-testing 
will require more paperwork and monitoring. 
More research is needed on administrative costs, 
but the costs of administering either a NIT or 
a UBI are small compared to the administra-
tion of benefits conditional on work and other 
behavioral requirements. 
Granting these points, I would nonetheless welcome a 
NIT as a good second-best minimum income scheme. 
While it lacks UBI’s universality, it shares UBI’s uncondi-
tionality, and that is the more important feature. If it has a 
better chance of being understood, integrated with the 
existing tax system, and passed into law in the US than a 
UBI, then I’m for it.  But we should not set aside UBI on 
the basis of a misunderstanding of its real cost to taxpayers.
UBI AND OTHER WELFARE BENEFITS
Daniel Soucier (2019) suggests that the current safety net is well fitted to social needs and that technolog-
ical change can bring opportunities. No one can deny the 
latter, but cash transfers are not meant to take the place of 
new forms of work. Rather, they can lighten the burden of 
what would otherwise be a very rough transition on those 
least able to carry it. More importantly they ensure that 
everyone shares in the benefits of technological change, 
and not just the small percentage of the population that 
owns most of the capital wealth. Luisa Deprez (2019) 
puts to rest the idea that the current system of benefits 
is adequate. Income from work since the great recession, 
even in conjunction with the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), is “not keeping pace with too many families’ 
basic needs.” Even at full employment, tens of thousands 
are officially unemployed in Maine, are involuntarily 
part-time, or are discouraged from seeking employment. 
And the safety net programs are “eliminated or so severely 
restricted that they are unusable by the people who need 
them.” UBI (or NIT) could fill some of the gaps. Almaz 
Zelleke (2019) shows how the incentives of a UBI scheme 
encourage more prudent choices in the labor market and 
the household than nonindividualized and conditional 
benefits.
Canarie is right to raise the question of the relation-
ship between UBI and other benefits of the welfare state. 
But to be clear, unlike some conservative proponents of 
UBI, I do not favor eliminating the rest of the welfare state. 
Charles Murray (2006) would substitute a UBI not only 
for cash benefits but for Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid, and he would require people to use part of their 
UBI to purchase health insurance in the private market. 
An advantage of Murray’s proposal is that the cost of the 
UBI would be covered by the elimination of the other 
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benefits, thus setting aside worries about how to pay for it. 
However, Murray’s plan would make poor and working 
people worse off and should for that reason be rejected 
(Zelleke 2008). A sensible welfare reform would substitute 
a UBI for some cash benefits, such as TANF or food stamps, 
further lowering the actual net cost, but unless pitched at a 
very high level, UBI would likely require some topping up 
for other benefits, such as unemployment or disability, to 
avoid making needy people worse off. This should address 
Harvey’s concern about the involuntarily unemployed not 
being compensated sufficiently by a UBI. The relevant ques-
tion is whether all cash benefits should continue to be 
conditional and means-tested, or whether some should be 
converted into an unconditional UBI. Opponents of UBI 
(or NIT) need to be clear in their defense of the condition-
alities and justify the consequent stigma, shame, and viola-
tions of privacy, poverty traps, and failures of uptake that 
result. 
Canarie speculates that people would be worse off 
trading TANF benefits and food stamps for a UBI of $1,000 
per month for adults and $500 per month for children. 
However, according to the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities (2018, 2019; Burnside and Floyd 2019), the 
combined maximum monthly benefits in Maine, for a 
family of three, of TANF, SNAP (food stamps), and the 
EITC, is about $1,381. If those programs were replaced by 
a UBI combined benefit off $2,500 per month, those fami-
lies would be better off, and the additional cost of UBI 
could be considerably reduced.
JOB GUARANTEES AND UBI
I agree with Harvey that a minimum income guarantee (whether UBI or NIT) and a job guarantee can be 
complementary. However, the opportunity cost of a UBI is 
not as great as he claims, once we focus on the net cost, and 
a job guarantee has its own opportunity cost. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Howard 2005), there are 
good reasons for government-funded jobs, particularly 
when there are needs that are not supplied by the market 
because of inadequate monetary demand. These include 
services for the poor, who lack the money to purchase them, 
and the provision of public goods such as roads, education, 
public transportation, and alternative energy. But if public 
employment goes beyond such expenditures, then the 
government is competing with private companies, driving 
them out of business and compounding unemployment, or 
creating phony jobs that waste public money in order to 
preserve the illusion that everyone is working. In these latter 
cases, it is better to give people cash. If the need for public 
sector jobs is high enough, then a jobs program would 
increase the number of net contributors to the UBI, and the 
net cost of a UBI could decrease. But if rising precarity and 
job losses due to automation outstrip the need for genuine 
public sector jobs, a program that guarantees, in addition, a 
good job to everyone who wants one could be very expen-
sive indeed. The administrative and supervisory expenses of 
such a program would also be significant and would come 
at the expense of more efficient cash transfers and other uses 
of public funds.
Harvey is right that a UBI cannot secure the right to 
work. That is not its goal. But the income floor can facilitate 
employment and other forms of social participation even if 
it does not guarantee everyone a job. First, it can enable 
people to take internships, or low-paying, but otherwise 
desirable jobs, in which skills can be learned and connec-
tions made. Second, it can facilitate care work and volun-
teering that would not be possible without the income 
support. The modest UBI proposals under discussion would 
not enable everyone to withdraw from the labor market. But 
people sharing housing, or pooling income from various 
sources, would have options with a UBI that would other-
wise not be possible.
LUCK AND FIRST STEPS
Canarie calls attention to the wealth people have accumu-lated through hard work, which I do not wish to deny. 
But Zelleke (2019) is right to question whether hard work 
can explain “the difference between the average income of 
the top 1 percent of Mainers...and the bottom 99 percent....
Or the likely divergence in the future success of the almost 
17 percent of children living in poverty in Maine compared 
to those living in households with above average income.” 
Cherry-picking examples of people who have earned most 
of their wealth through hard work distracts attention from 
the systematic inequalities of opportunity that are due to 
luck, and that are compounded over generations. A UBI, 
and other policies such as raising the minimum wage, are 
designed to share the benefits of rising productivity more 
widely, instead of allowing them to be appropriated for no 
good social purpose by the wealthiest Americans as a result 
of our tax and other policies over the past few decades.
While many questions may remain about means-
testing, the optimal level of a minimum income and how to 
finance it, and the relevance, if any, of the gross cost of a 
UBI, people who disagree on these questions may still 
converge on some first steps such as Zelleke (2019) suggests: 
start with the most sympathetic beneficiaries—the elderly 
and children—and with a small benefit. If possible, create a 
dedicated tax, like that supporting Social Security. If the 
policy is successful, the level, the pool of eligible beneficia-
ries, and the tax base can all be extended. If not, we will have 
learned something useful to guide future policy making.
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ENDNOTES
1 For more on NIT, see Block and Manza (1997) and Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 32–40). A modest nega-
tive income tax has been proposed by Rep. Rashida 
Tlaib (D-MI). Like Sen. Kamala Harris’s LIFT act, Tlaib’s 
LIFT-Plus proposes a tax credit, $3,000 for singles, 
$6,000 for married couples, that phases out between 
$30,000 and $60,000. But Harris’s proposal remains 
within the framework of the Earned Income Tax Credit: 
it increases with earned income, and if you earn 
nothing, you get nothing. Tlaib’s bill has no phase-in, 
and so is a genuine NIT: “if you earn $0, you get $3,000 
per person. No exceptions.” Lift-Plus goes much further 
than LIFT toward eliminating poverty, including the 
non-working poor and children, and setting a higher 
floor for all (Matthews 2019, 2018). 
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